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CASE NOTES
BANKRUPTCY-VOIDABLE PREFERENCES-PROPERTY GIVEN TO SECURE
INDORSEMENT ON NOTE 1POR ANTECEDENT DEBT IS VOIDABLE
PREFERENCE AS TO CREDITOR IF INDORSER SATISFIES DEBT.
Aulick v. Largent (4th Cir. 1961).
Ansel B. Solenberger, the debtor and eventual bankrupt, was indebted
to Mrs. Aulick in the amount of $10,700.00 and to Eldridge M.
Lemley in the amount of $3,000.00. Mrs. Aulick, the creditor, was pressing
for payment, and the debtor induced Lemley (hereinafter the transferee)
to accept his promissory note for $10,700.00, payable to the transferee and
to immediately indorse the same over to the creditor. In return, the
transferee received a note for $13,700.00 (representing the amount of the
indorsed note and the debt already owed to him) and, as collateral, a num-
ber of shares of the capital stock of a certain corporation. The creditor
had no knowledge of the stock transfer, nor had she and the transferee any
contact with each other previous to the above arrangement, but the
transferee was aware of the purpose of the transaction. A month later,
the debtor was adjudged an involuntary bankrupt. When the note which
the transferee had indorsed reached maturity and remained unpaid, the
creditor proceeded in a state court against the transferee as indorser
and received judgment, which was satisfied in full. Thereafter, the referee
in bankruptcy of the debtor's estate determined that the transfer of stock
to the transferee as security for his indorsement resulted in a voidable
preference to the creditor under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.' An action was
brought in the district court to review these findings and the district court
affirmed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held
that the transfer of stock to the transferee to secure a contemporaneous in-
1. Bankruptcy Act, § 60, 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958): "Preferred
creditors.(a) (1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the
property of a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of
an antecedent debt, made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within
four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating a pro-
ceeding under this title, the effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor
to obtain a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same
class....
(b) Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor re-
ceiving it or to be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has,
at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor
is insolvent. Where the preference is voidable, the trustee may recover the property
or, if it has been converted, its value from any person who has received or
converted such property, except a bona fide purchaser from or lienor of the
debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent value .... "
(468)
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dorsement of a note to the creditor, which was to cover an antecedent debt
to the latter, was a voidable preference as to the creditor. The court
ordered that the transferee should return the stock to the trustee in bank-
ruptcy and that the creditor should turn over the payment made by the
transferee on his indorsement to the trustee who, in turn, should restore it to
the transferee. Aulick v. Largent, 295 F. 2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961).
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act deals with preferences and their
voidability. Its prime purpose is to protect the general creditors who
must share proportionately in the proceeds of the estate. A preference
given to one creditor, of course, depletes the assets from which the
other creditors may draw. Under this section, preferential transfers
given directly to the creditor are voidable if the preferred creditor should
reasonably have known at the time of the transfer that the debtor was
insolvent. More circuitous transactions present greater difficulties.
Nonetheless, it was early recognized that the restrictions imposed
by the Bankruptcy Act could not be thwarted by bestowing the preference
in a less direct manner.2 So long as the creditor was the real recipient of
the transfer, and the other statutory elements were met,3 the courts have
swept aside the ruse and declared the transaction for what it was.
In 1917, the United States Supreme Court, in Dean v. Dazhis,4 an-
nounced what has become the leading decision in the field of indirect
preferential transfers. In that case, Dean, at the request of a certain
debtor, paid the amount of a note owed by the latter and received in
exchange a new note which was secured by a mortgage on all of the
debtor's property. Within four months, the debtor went into bankruptcy
and the trustee brought suit against Dean, as transferee, claiming that
the mortgage constituted a preference and was voidable as such.5 The
2. E.g., In re Beerman, 112 Fed. 663 (N.D. Ga. 1901); Grandison v. NationalBank of Commerce, 220 Fed. 981 (W.D.N.Y. 1915), aff'd, 231 Fed. 800 (2d Cir.
1916), cert denied, 242 U.S. 644, 378 S. Ct. 213 (1916); Farmers' State Bank v.
Freeman, 249 Fed. 579 (8th Cir. 1918); MacHenry v. Dwelling Building and Loan
Ass'n, 259 Fed. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1919), aff'd, 263 Fed. 702 (3d Cir. 1920), appeal
dismissed, 256 U.S. 685, 41 S. Ct. 622 (1920).
3. See, COLL19R, BANKRUPTCY, Vol. 3, at 755-56 (14th ed. 1961) : "Briefly stated,
the elements of a preference under § 60a consist of the following: a debtor (1)
making or suffering a transfer of his property, (2) to or for the benefit of a
creditor, (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt [resulting in the depletion of
the estate], (4) while insolvent, and (5) within four months of bankruptcy or ofthe original petition under Chapters X, XI, XII or XIII of the Act, (6) the
effect of which transfer will be to enable the creditor to obtain a greater per-
centage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class. . . . However,
under subdivision b a preference is voidable by the trustee in bankruptcy only
upon proof of the additional element that (7) the creditor receiving or to bebenefited by the preference had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was
insolvent."
4. 242 U.S. 438, 37 S. Ct. 130 (1917).
5. The action was brought under § 60 of the Bankruptcy Act as amended in
1910. The amendments to the Bankruptcy Act after 1898 are relatively unimportant
as far as the present problem is concerned, since they deal chiefly with the
requisite knowledge of the transferee regarding the preference. The provisions
which were added regarding the indirection of the transfer are also of littleimport, since the courts had already determined that mere circuity could not defeat
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Court noted that since Dean had given present consideration for the
transfer, the payment was not on account of an antecedent debt and,
consequently, the transaction was not a preference as far as he was con-
cerned. By way of dicta, the Court stated that the bank (the original
creditor), not Dean, was preferred.6 The Court, however, held that,
notwithstanding the fact that the transfer was not a preference to the
transferee, it did constitute a fraudulent conveyance under § 67e of the
then Bankruptcy Act. 7 In this connection, the Court declared: "A transfer,
the intent (or obviously necessary effect) of which is to deprive creditors
of the benefits sought to be secured by the Bankruptcy Act, 'hinders, delays
or defrauds creditors' within the meaning of § 67e."'8 It added that "...
where the advance is made to enable the debtor to make a preferential
payment with bankruptcy in contemplation, the transaction presents an
element upon which fraud may be predicated."9
The present court deals extensively with the Dean case in relation
to the latter's decision that there was no preference to the transferee
under § 60, a holding which it regards as conclusive in the instant case,
but seems to ignore as irrelevant the fact that the Court in Dean did find
fraud as to Dean and compelled him to turn over the transfer to the
depleted estate on this account. It is difficult to see why a similar result
could not have been reached as to the indorser in the present case under the
Dean rationale. Although the court seems to be upon solid ground re-
garding its finding that there was a voidable preference as to Mrs. Aulick
(the creditor) but not as to Lemley (the transferee), 10 except as to the
the impact of the Act. See, supra note 2. Cf. COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, at 764-77
(14th ed. 1961) for an excellent review of all the modifications of § 60 since 1898.
6. 242 U.S. at 443, 37 S. Ct. at 131 (1917).
7. Bankruptcy Act § 67e, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 564 (1898): "That all conveyances,
transfers, assignments, or incumbrances of his property, or any part thereof, made
or given by a person adjudged a bankrupt under the provisions of this Act subse-
quent to the passage of this Act and within four months prior to the filing of this
petition, with the intent and purpose on his part to hinder, delay, or defraud his
creditors, or any of them, shall be null and void as against the creditors of such
debtor, except as to purchasers in good faith and for a present fair consideration..
8. Dean v. Davis, supra note 6, at 444,37 S. Ct. at 131.
9. Id. at 444, 37 S.,Ct. at 132.
10. A decision heavily relied upon by the creditor in the present case is
National Bank of Newport v. National Herkimer County Bank, 225 U.S. 178, 32
S. Ct. 633 (1912), which was decided five years prior to the Dean decision. That
case, however, seems quite distinguishable upon its facts. There the original
creditor indorsed the note he held from the debtor to a third party and pocketed the
proceeds. When the note neared maturity, the creditor paid the third party and had
this amount entered on his account with the debtor. The debtor became bankrupt
and the trustee brought suit against the third party on the theory that the charging
of the bankrupt's account to the amount that the creditor paid to the third party
was a preferential transfer as to the third party. The Court found no such
preference. The relationship of the parties' in the Newport case was quite different
from that in the instant situation. There, the original debt was owed to the
indorser and not to the defendant third party. The original creditor-indorser did
not indorse the note for the benefit of the bankrupt, but for his own benefit. The
creditor voluntarily assumed liability as an indorser; the bankrupt promised nothing
in return. The subsequent payment of the note was also for his own protection.
The bankrupt's crediting of the indorser's account was distinct from the transaction
[VOL. 7
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$3,000.00 which the debtor already owed the transferee, the propriety of
the remedy imposed is considerably more questionable in that it imposes
the burden of the restitution upon the innocent creditor rather than upon
the transferee who acted with full knowledge of the purpose of the debtor's
machinations. Considering the policy behind Dean v. Davis, namely that
of holding the knowing third-party transferee guilty of fraud when he
receives security from the insolvent for a loan which he knows is to be
used to prefer an antecedent creditor to the detriment of other creditors,
and relating this to the Bankruptcy Act's general policy of prohibiting
certain depletions of the debtor's estate, it would seem that in a case like
the present one the knowing third-party should bear this burden rather than
the innocent creditor. From an equitable point of view, one who takes
under conditions which are constructively fraudulent should be the one
to make restitution,11 and such a result does not impair the protection
between the indorser and the indorsee, and there is no evidence that this credit was
given as an inducement to the indorser to pay the note. Moreover, under the terms
of the Bankruptcy Act at that time, 32 Stat. 799 (1903), it was necessary that the
person receiving the preference have reasonable cause to believe that he was
being preferred in order that the transfer be deemed voidable. There was no
evidence to this effect in that case. Under the present Act, all that is necessary is
that the person benefited have reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insol-
vent (See supra note 1). The trial court in the instant case found that both parties
were aware of this fact. Also, it seems quite clear that the crediting of the account
in Newport was not for the benefit of the defendant third party but solely for the
indorser's benefit. If the transfer had been part of an agreement whereby the
indorser would pay the indorsee-defendant-third party on the note, the case would
be closer to the present problem. But even with the facts as they were, there is no
indication that the trustee could not have had the transaction voided as far as
the indorser-creditor was concerned. It should be noted that there has been some
tendency to extend the broad language of this case beyond its context. E.g.,
Olmstead v. Massachusetts Trust Co., 11 F.2d 410 (D. Mass. 1926), which was
cited by the creditor in the present case as supporting her position.
On the other hand, Grandison v. Nat. Bank of Commerce, 220 Fed. 981(W.D.N.Y. 1915), aft'd, 231 Fed. 800 (2d Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 644,
37 S. Ct. 213 (1916), involved a situation very similar to the present one. A certain
corporation had given a bank several notes evidencing the company's indebtedness.
Because of the company's subsequent financial difficulties, the president of the corpora-
tion, at the request of the bank, personally indorsed the notes. As security for this
indorsement, the company turned over to the president part of its accounts receivable,
from which the president drew when the notes became due. The court held that
the diminution of the company's assets for the benefit of the prior creditor (the
bank) was a voidable preference as far as the bank was concerned and ordered the
transfer returned to the trustee.' The court reasoned, at 983:
To constitute a preference it was not necessary that the assignment of the
accounts receivable should be made directly to the bank. It was enough that
the transaction which resulted in the indorsement of the renewal notes and the
subsequent collection of the accounts receivable were for the benefit of the
bank. Alexander [the company president] concededly received the assignment
of the account from the bankrupt to secure him as an indorser on the overdue
promissory notes held by the defendant [the bank]. Such a transfer made by
insolvent falls within the prohibition of the Bankruptcy Act.
Although the Grandison case was decided prior to Dean, the present court was
strongly influenced by its decision and rationale. Aulick v. Largent, 295 F2d
41, 50-51 (1961).
11. § 67(d) (3) of the present version of the Bankruptcy Act, 66 Stat. 428
(1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107 (d) (3) (1958), relates to "constructive fraud": "Every
transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor who is or will be thereby
rendered insolvent, within four months prior to the filing of a petition initiating a
proceeding under this title by or against him is fraudulent, as to then existing and
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